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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William J. Fletcher appeals from the district court's Judgment dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred when it denied
his motion for the appointment of counsel, because he raised the possibility of a
valid claim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Fletcher was indicted by an Ada County grand jury on two counts of lewd
conduct with a minor child under sixteen, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508.
(R., p.35.) The complaining witness was Mr. Fletcher's stepdaughter, who was between
five and eight years old when the acts allegedly occurred.

(R., p.35.) Mr. Fletcher

initially entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.35.)
After Mr. Fletcher rejected at least two plea offers, the parties entered into a plea
agreement.

(R., pp.10-12, 35, 103.)

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Fletcher

entered an Alford1 plea to an amended charge of injury to child, felony·, in violation of
Idaho Code § 18-1501(1).

(R., pp.35, 91.)

The district court followed the plea

agreement and imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.35, 91.) After Mr. Fletcher participated in a "rider," the

district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed the sentence.

(R., p.92.)

Mr. Fletcher then filed an appeal. (R., p.92.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Fletcher filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.4-18.)

He also filed a Motion and Affidavit for Appointment of Counsel.
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(R., pp.25-28.)

The post-conviction petition raised three grounds for relief:

(1) that

Mr. Fletcher received ineffective assistance of counsel during his criminal case process,
(2) that he received a sentence disproportionate to the offense for which he was
convicted, and he should have received a sentence of four years for misdemeanor
injury to child, and (3) that his race played a huge role in his criminal process, and his
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered because he was persuaded by ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., p.5.)
Mr. Fletcher is an African-American.

(E.g., R., p.76.)

On the claim that race

played a huge role in his criminal process and his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily
entered, Mr. Fletcher asserted that the police department was biased and targeted him
because of the color of his skin, and that a full investigation was not done because the
complaining witness was half-white. (R., p.6.) He further asserted that his plea was not
knavvingly or voluntarily entered because he was persuaded by trial counsel to take the
plea instead of being convicted and receiving a life sentence, even though he might be
innocent.

(R., pp.6, 12.)

When questioned, trial counsel told Mr. Fletcher such

convictions had happened before and that he was in Ada County in the State of Idaho,
which Mr. Fletcher took as a racial comment. (R., pp.6-7, 11.) He asserted that he "felt
like I had no option and no other way around the situation." (R., p.12.)
The State then filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.31-33.) The State
argued that Mr. Fletcher's post-conviction petition did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact that would entitle him to the requested relief.

(R., p.31.)

The State

elaborated on this argument in its Answer and Brief in Support of Motion for Summary

1

See Alford v. Norlh Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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Disr11issal of Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

(R., pp.34-43.)

On the claim that

Mr. Fletcher's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, the State argued that, at
the change of plea hearing, Mr. Fletcher stated he was satisfied with trial counsel,
understood the plea agreement, and wanted to plead guilty. (R., pp.41-42.) Because
Mr. Fletcher did not assert what about the plea was not knowing or voluntary, his claim
was "a bare and conclusory assertion which should be dismissed." (R., p.42.) As for
race playing a role in Mr. Fletcher's case, the State contended that those allegations
should be summarily dismissed for being bare and conclusory. (R., p.42.)
The State also argued that Mr. Fletcher's other claims should be dismissed.
(R., pp.39-41.)

Thus, the State requested that the district court grant its summary

dismissal motion and deny the post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
(R., p.42.)
Mr. Fletcher later filed a "Motion to Proceed with Petitioner Post-Conviction
Relief." (R., pp.66-84.) He reiterated that, when he rejected a plea offer from the State,
trial counsel stated that if Mr. Fletcher did not take the plea, he would not win at trial and
would be convicted on the original charges of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
even though he might be innocent. (R., p.76.) When Mr. Fletcher asked how that could
be possible, trial counsel told him to look where he was (Idaho), and that the jury would
usually believe anything a child says. (R., p.76.)
Mr. Fletcher subsequently filed an "Addendum to Motion to Proceed with
Petitioner Post Conviction Relief." (R., pp.85-90.) Attached to the addendum was a
letter from the complaining witness and from Mr. Fletcher's son. (R., pp.85, 88.) The
addendum also discussed similar injury to child cases. (R., p.86.)
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The district court then issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., pp.91-95.) The
district court stated that, "Although the State's moving papers themselves show that
summary dismissal is warranted, the Court will provide some additional analysis
supporting that outcome, as well as supporting the conclusion that Fletcher is not
entitled to appointed counsel." (R., p.92.)
The district court cited Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2006), for the
proposition that, "\/\/here ... the defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy
the prejudice element [for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], the claimant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."

(R., p.93 (internal

quotation marks omitted).) The petitioner in Plant asserted that his counsel talked him
into pleading guilty without thoroughly investigating his case, but the petition did not
describe the investigation that should have been done or describe the helpful
information that might have been uncovered. (R., p.93 (citing Plant, 143 Idaho at 762).)
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the petition was too vague to suggest even the
possibility of a valid claim, and that appointment of counsel to represent the petitioner
was unwarranted. (R., p.93 (citing Plant, 143 Idaho at 762).)2
The district court then determined that Mr. Fletcher's "allegations are not
materially better developed than those found in Plant to be insufficient to warrant even

2

However, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Plant ultimately vacated the district court's
order denying the defendant's motion for appointed counsel. Plant, 143 Idaho at 763.
In response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, the defendant sent the
district court a letter containing additional allegations "sufficient to raise at least the
possibility of a valid claim .... " Plant, 143 Idaho at 762-63 (emphasis in original).
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the appointment of counsel, much less to state a claim that is fit to avoid summary
dismissal." (R., p.93.)
The petition does not set forth a factual basis for concluding that Fletcher's
trial counsel's performance was deficient. It also does not establish a
reasonable probability that Fletcher would not have entered an Alford plea
in the absence of some particular performance deficiency, as it does not
draw a causal link between any such deficiency and Fletcher's decision to
enter an Alford plea. As noted above, Fletcher does not explain how the
investigation his trial counsel allegedly failed to perform could have
generated evidence tending to disprove that he engaged in the particular
conduct of which he was convicted. Consequently, under Plant, Fletcher's
allegations are insufficient to either warrant the appointment of counsel or
avoid summary dismissal.

(R., pp.93-94.)
Thus, the district court determined

"that Fletcher is not entitled to the

appointment of post-conviction counsel or to post-conviction relief and that no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings."

(R., p.94.)

The district court gave

Mr. Fletcher notice of its intent to deny the motion for appointment of counsel and
dismiss the post-conviction petition, and granted him twenty days to respond.
(R., p.94.)
Mr. Fletcher filed, within the twenty-day period, a "2 nd Addendum to Motion to
Proceed with Petitioner Post-Conviction Relief" (R., pp.96-101 ), and a "Motion Brief
Reply to the Proposed Dismissal of Petitioner Post Conviction Relief." (R., pp.102-116.)
He again asserted that he would have rejected the plea agreement but for the
ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., p.103.)

He repeated and expanded upon the

assertion that his trial counsel told him he would be found guilty of the original charges if
he did not accept the plea bargain, even though he might be innocent. (R., pp.103-04.)
When Mr. Fletcher questioned the advice of trial counsel, she told him "that was [the]
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way it goes and to look around [where] the petitioner was as his race was a big issue."
(R., p.104.)
Additionally, Mr. Fletcher
Motion Brief

an "Affidavit of Sworn Statement in Support

to the Proposed Motion Intent to

of Petitioner

Conviction Relief' (R., pp.117-20), and a "Motion: Right to Bail Pending Appeal Idaho
Rules of Court 46(0)," pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 46(d). (R., pp.121-23.)
The district court then issued an Order of Dismissal.

124-26.) The district

court denied the Rule 46(d) motion for an appellate bond uc,,,,c""

it should have been

filed "in his criminal case" and "his

would be

under I.C.

anyway, it appearing to the Court that the appeal is frivolous." (R., p.124.) The district
court also determined that Mr. Fletcher had not shown "reason to allow this case to
proceed further.

, p.124.) Thus,

district court denied

motion for appointment

of counsel and dismissed the post-conviction petition. (R., pp.125, 127-28.)

Mr. Fletcher subsequently filed a "Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment on Post
Conviction Relief/Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea/Expungement of Conviction."
(R., pp.129-31.) Mr. Fletcher asked the district court to amend or alter the Judgment.
(R., p.129.) Additionally, he asked for leave to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.130.)

Mr. Fletcher also filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment
dismissing his post-conviction petition. 3 (R., pp.132-41.) On appeal, he challenges the
district court's denial of his motion for the appointment of counsel.

3

After Mr. Fletcher filed his Notice of Appeal here, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the district court in the underlying criminal case. See State v. Fletcher,
No. 41871, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 797 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2014).
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Fletcher's motion for the appointment of
counsel, because he raised the possibility of a valid claim?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fletcher's Motion For The A ointment Of
Counsel, Because He Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim

A.

Introduction
Mr. Fletcher asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion for the

appointment of counsel, because he raised the possibility of a valid claim. The district
court used an improper legal standard when it denied the motion for the appointment of
counsel, because it denied the motion, at least in part, on the basis that Mr. Fletcher
had not met the higher threshold for surviving summary dismissal. Mr. Fletcher raised
the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel's ineffective assistance prevented him
from entering a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea, because he asserted that trial
counsel intimated to him that local racial prejudice would make trying to put on a
defense a futile gesture, even though he claimed he was innocent.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
"An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction

Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903
(2007). Like any other civil plaintiff, a petitioner for post-conviction relief must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations upon which the application for
post-conviction relief is based. Id. However, unlike a complaint in a normal civil action,
"an application for post-conviction relief must include affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included." Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
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If a petitioner for post-conviction relief "is unable to pay court costs and expenses
of representation ... a court-appointed attorney may be made available to the applicant
in the preparation of the application." i.C. § 19-4904. 'The decision to grant or deny a
request for a court-appointed attorney lies within the discretion of the district court."
A1elton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 341 (2009).

"However, at a minimum, the trial court

must carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the
substantive merits of the petition." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
"For the purposes of I.C. § 19-4904, the trial court should determine if the petitioner is
able to afford counsel and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be
appointed to assist the petitioner." Id. at 341-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The proper standard for determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent
petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition alleges facts showing
the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant's
behalf." Id. at 342 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

"In determining

whether the appointment of counsel would be appropriate, every inference must run in
the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial court must
do more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. The
court must also consider whether circumstances prevent the petitioner
from making a more thorough investigation into the facts. An indigent
defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly
be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in
the court record. Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present
sufficient facts showing that his or her counsel's performance was
deficient or that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law.
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Id. (quoting Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-55 (2007)). "Therefore, the trial court

should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid
claim such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim."

Id. (quoting Swader, 143

Idaho at 655). A petitioner may also make the required showing in documents filed after
the petition. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762-63 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

The District Court Used An Improper Legal Standard When It Denied
Mr. Fletcher's Motion For The Appointment Of Counsel
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Fletcher asserts that the district court used an

improper legal standard when it denied his motion for the appointment of counsel. The
district court denied his motion for the appointment of counsel, at least in part, on the
basis that Mr. Fletcher had not met the higher threshold for surviving summary
dismissal. After discussing Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758 (Ct. App. 2006), the district
court determined that Mr. Fletcher's "allegations are not materially better developed
than those found in Plant to be insufficient to warrant even the appointment of counsel,
much less to state a claim that is fit to avoid summary dismissal." (R., p.93.) The
district court then stated that Mr. Fletcher's petition was insufficient because it "does not
establish a reasonable probability that Fletcher would not have entered an Alford plea in
the absence of some particular performance deficiency .... " (R., p.94.)
The district court's statement on whether the petition established prejudice
indicates that the district court used the standard for surviving summary dismissal when
it denied the motion for the appointment of counsel, not the lower standard that applies
to motions for the appointment of counsel. "The decision to appoint counsel and the

10

decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed are controlled by two
different standards."

Melton, 148 Idaho at 342 (quoting Swader, 143 Idaho at 655).

"[T]he threshold showing that is necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel [is]
considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a
petition." Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Swader, 143 Idaho
at 655).
By determining that the petition did not "establish a reasonable probability" that
he was prejudiced by any deficient performance by trial counsel (R., p.94 (emphasis
added)), the district court suggested that Mr. Fletcher's claim was not supported by
evidence sufficient to survive summary disrnissal. 4 See Melton, 148 Idaho at 342. But
in determining whether a petitioner has "raised the possibility of valid claim," such that
counsel should be appointed, a court instead considers "whether appointment of
counsel would have assisted him in conducting an investigation into facts not in the
record and whether a reasonable person with adequate means would have been willing
to retain counsel to conduct that further investigation into the claim." See id.; Swader,
143 Idaho at 655. The district court should have based its decision on the motion for
the appointment of counsel on those considerations, not on whether Mr. Fletcher's claim
would survive summary dismissal on the merits.

Thus, the district court used an

improper legal standard when it denied the motion for the appointment of counsel.
However, the district court's use of an improper legal standard does not end this
Court's analysis.

"When addressing the issue of appointment of counsel in post-

4

"Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." Charboneau 144 Idaho
at 903. (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b) & (c)).
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conviction proceedings, this Court examines whether the possibility of a valid claim
exists before determining that an error in failing to appoint counsel requires remand."
Melton, 148 Idaho at 342. If a petitioner does not raise the possibility of a valid claim,

then the district court's error did not affect the petitioner's substantial rights. Id. Courts
disregard any error which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Id.

(quoting I.R.C.P. 61 ).

Mr. Fletcher Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That Trial Counsel's
Ineffective Assistance Prevented Hirn From Entering A Knowing, Voluntary And
Intelligent Plea

D.

Mr. Fletcher asserts that he raised the possibility of a valid claim that trial

counsel's ineffective assistance prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent plea, because he asserted that trial counsel intimated to him that local racial
prejudice would make trying to put on a defense a futile gesture, even though he
claimed he was innocent.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the
States via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees criminal
defendants the effective assistance of counsel. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760
(1988).

Similarly, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants "reasonably competent assistance of counsel." Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho
631,635 (1986).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
UPCPA. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477 (Ct. App. 2009). "Claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel are reviewed utilizing the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444 (2008). "To
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prevail on such a claim, the applicant for post-conviction relief must demonstrate
(1) counsel's performance fell be!ow an objective standard of reasonableness; and
(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have
been different."

Id.

To establish a deficiency, the petitioner must show that the

attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. McKay v.
State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 (2010). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the
attorney's deficient performance. Id. at 571-72.
An appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings in an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for clear error, and exercises free and independent review
of the district court's application of law. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 96 (1998).

1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel, Including Leading A Defendant To
Believe That Racial Prejudice V\/ould Determine The Jury Verdict And
Make Trying To Put On A Defense Futile, May Prevent A Defendant From
Entering A Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent Plea

Ineffective assistance of counsel may prevent a defendant from entering a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774

(1970). "For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea
was entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner." Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 527 (2007).

That'* analysis involves inquiry into three areas:

"(1)

whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature
of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood
the consequences of pleading guilty." Id.
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"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60 (2004) (quoting Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"Where ... a

defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the
advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."

Id.

(quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 56) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Strategic or tactical
decisions made by counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Id.
Counsel may be ineffective, and prevent a defendant from entering a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary plea, by leading a defendant to believe that racial prejudice
would determine the jury verdict and make trying to put on a defense futile. In a case
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the district court
concluded that a defendant in a federal habeas corpus proceeding was denied effective
assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal case because, inter a/ia, counsel gave
the defendant and his family "the impression that a trial would be futile because of racial
prejudice." Thomas v. Lockharl, 738 F.2d 304, 306-07 (8 th Cir. 1984). The defendant,
Thomas, was a black man, and his court-appointed counsel, Barker, "made several
vague statements" to Thomas and his family about counsel's "own racial prejudice" and
"also told them he doubted that a jury would believe a black man's testimony instead of
that of a white victim." Id. at 306-07. Thomas then entered a guilty plea without going
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to trial. Id. at 306. The district court concluded that Barker's comments and his other
acts and omissions "prnvented Thomas from entering a knowing, voluntary, and
inteiligent plea." Id. at 307.
On review, the Eighth Circuit elaborated on Barker's comments to Thomas and
his family, and the effects of counsel's comments:
Barker also gave Thomas and his family the impression that Thomas
would have to prove his innocence. Barker's remarks led Thomas to
believe that racial prejudice would determine the jury verdict and that
Barker did not want to handle the case because of its interracial aspect.
Thomas, for example, testified that Barker told him a jury would not
believe a black man accused of the rape of a white woman. Similarly,
Thomas' mother recalled that Barker indicated that Thomas did not have
"a prayer because there was a black man against a white lady, that
[Thomas] would get fifty [years] to life in the pen." Barker indicated that he
would feel "funny" representing a black man accused of raping a white
woman. He admitted that when Thomas' mother told him that, according
to her Bible, race should not make any difference, he replied, '"Sister,
you're not in the church house, you're in the courthouse in Monticello."'
Barker may have been trying conscientiously to alter Thomas and his
family to potential problems arising from racial prejudice. Nevertheless his
statements left them with the understanding that he did not want to
represent a black man accused of rape and that to go to trial would be an
exercise in futility. Thomas' step-father declined to hire an attorney for
Thomas after Barker suggested that Thomas did not have any chance of a
result in his favor. The state trial court's perfunctory mention of the
presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof was insufficient
to dispel the inferences Thomas and his family necessarily drew from
Barker's remarks and from his attitude.
Id. at 309. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

The Eighth Circuit held that counsel's above comments, as well as other acts and
omissions by counsel, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 310. The
Thomas Court concluded "that the findings of fact of the District Court are not clearly

erroneous and that the District Court did not commit any error of law." Id. "We agree
with the District Court that Thomas has made a convincing showing that his appointed
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counsel did not fulfill his responsibility as an advocate on Thomas' behalf, thereby
preventing a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice by Thomas to plead guilty." Id.
Thus, counsel may be ineffective, and prevent a defendant from entering a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary plea, by leading a defendant to believe that racial prejudice
would determine the jury verdict and make trying to put on a defense futile.

2.

Mr. Fletcher Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That Trial Counsel's
Ineffective Assistance Prevented Hirn From Entering A Knowing,
Voluntary, And Intelligent Plea, Because Trial Counsel Intimated To Him
That Local Racial Prejudice Would Make Trying TQ~ Put On A Defense
Futile

Mr. Fletcher asserts that the facts alleged in his petition and subsequent filings
raise the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel's ineffective assistance prevented
him from entering a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea.

Like the defendant in

Thomas, Mr. Fletcher asserted that trial counsel intimated to him that local racial

prejudice would make trying to put on a defense a futile gesture, even though
Mr. Fletcher claimed he was innocent.
Bouchillon

See Thomas, 738 F.2d at 309; see also

v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 596 n.24 (5 th Cir. 1990) (comparing the counsel in

Thomas to a counsel who refused to put on an insanity defense).

In his petition, Mr. Fletcher asserted that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily
entered because trial counsel persuaded him to take a plea bargain instead of a life
sentence upon conviction, even though he might be innocent.

(R., p.6.)

When

questioned, trial counsel told Mr. Fletcher that it had happened before, and that he was
in Ada County in the State of Idaho. (R., pp.6-7.) Mr. Fletcher interpreted that as a
"racial comment." (R., p.7.)
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Later in the petition Mr. Fletcher asserted that, after he rejected a p!ea offer, trial
counsel told him if he did not take it, he would be automatically convicted of the original
charges, even though he might be innocent. (R., p.11.) Mr. Fletcher asserted that the
accusations against him were not true.

(R., p.10.)

When Mr. Fletcher asked trial

counsel how he would be automatically convicted, she "told me look where I'm at and
[it's] Idaho.

I took it as a racial comment." (R., p.11.) She also told him he had a

choice between life sentences for the original charges or a sentence of ten years under
the plea offer. (R., p.12.) According to Mr. Fletcher, "I feit like I had no option and no
other way around the situation. I knew I would not give up on my case because the
things that happen[ed] to me [were] wrong and I was judge[d] on [the] color of my skin."
(R., p.12.)
In his subsequent filings, Mr. Fletcher reiterated that trial counsel told him "that if
he didn't take the deal that he will not win his trial and the defendant would be convicted
of [the] original charge of lewd conduct with [a] minor under 16 although you might be
innocent." (R., p.76.) When Mr. Fletcher asked how that was possible when he should
receive a fair trial and trial counsel was supposed to represent him, trial counsel told
him "to look where he was which she was referring to Idaho, and [the] jury will usually
believe anything a child says and it has happen[ed] before." (R., p.76.) Mr. Fletcher
also asserted that trial counsel told him "that was [the] way it goes and to look around
[where] the petitioner was as his race was a big issue." (R., p.104.) Mr. Fletcher felt he
"was in a lose-lose situation just because he was an African-American, loving Christian
husband, loving father, a student and honor[ed] military veteran."
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(R., p.76.)

Trial

counsel further assured him that, looking at the situation, it was either life sentences or
a ten-year sentence. (R., p.77.)
With every inference running in his favor, the facts alleged in Mr. Fletcher's
petition and subsequent filings raise the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel's
ineffective assistance prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
plea. See Melton, 148 Idaho at 342; Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55; Plant, 143 Idaho at
762-63.

Like the defendant in Thomas, Mr. Fletcher asserted that trial counsel

intimated to him that local racial prejudice would make trying to put on a defense a futile
gesture, even though Mr. Fletcher claimed he was innocent. Similar to the counsel in

Thomas, 738 F.2d at 307, 309, Mr. Fletcher's trial counsel told him that he would
automatically lose his trial if he did not take the plea offer.

(R., pp.11-12, 76.) Trial

counsel then told Mr. Fletcher that the reason for that was because he was in Idaho and
his race was a big issue (R., pp.11-12, 76, 104), akin to the Thomas counsel's
comments that the defendant's race would be a crucial factor because he was "in the
courthouse in Monticello." See Thomas, 738 F.2d at 309.
Additionally, trial counsel told Mr. Fletcher that he would get a life sentence if he
did not take the plea offer (R., pp.12, 77), much like the counsel in Thomas indicated
that the defendant did not have a prayer and would get fifty years to life. Thomas, 738
F.2d at 309. Mr. Fletcher decided to take the plea offer after trial counsel convinced him
he "had no option and no other way around the situation" (see R., p.12), just as the
defendant in Thomas decided to plead guilty after counsel "suggested that Thomas did
not have any chance of a result in his favor." See Thomas, 738 F.2d at 309. In sum,
while trial counsel "may have been trying conscientiously to alert [Mr. Fletcher] to
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potential problems arising from racial prejudice," her statements nevertheless !eft
Mr. Fletcher "with the understanding that [she] did not want to represent a black man
accused of [lewd conduct] and that to go to trial would be an exercise in futility." See id.
Like the defendant in Thomas, Mr. Fletcher asserted that trial counsel intimated
to him that local racial prejudice would make trying to put on a defense a futile gesture,
even though Mr. Fletcher claimed he was innocent. See id.; Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at
596 n.24. In Thomas, the defendant's assertion helped support a valid claim that trial
counsel's ineffective assistance prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent plea. See Thomas, 738 F.2d at 309-10. Based on the similarities of the facts
in this case to those in Thomas, a reasonable person with adequate means in
Mr. Fletcher's position would be willing to retain counsel to investigate the possibility of
such a claim here.

See Swader, 143 Idaho at 654.

Thus, the facts alleged in

Mr. Fletcher's petition and subsequent filings raise the possibility of a valid claim that
trial counsel's ineffective assistance prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary
and intelligent plea. See Thomas, 738 F.2d at 309-10; Melton, 148 Idaho at 342; Plant,
143 Idaho at 762-63.
Because Mr. Fletcher raised the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel's
ineffective assistance prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
plea, the district court erred when it denied his motion for the appointment of counsel.
See Melton, 148 Idaho at 342; Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55.

Thus, the judgment

dismissing Mr. Fletcher's petition for post-conviction relief should be vacated, the order
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel should be reversed, and the case
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should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

See Swader, 143

Idaho at 655.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, reverse the order denying
his motion for the appointment of counsel, and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of February, 2015.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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